The Trinity and the Freedom of God by Molnar, Paul D.
Journal for Christian Theological Research
Volume 8 Article 1
2003
The Trinity and the Freedom of God
Paul D. Molnar
St. John's University, molnarp@stjohns.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.luthersem.edu/jctr
Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal for
Christian Theological Research by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary. For more information, please contact
akeck001@luthersem.edu.
Recommended Citation
Molnar, Paul D. (2003) "The Trinity and the Freedom of God," Journal for Christian Theological Research: Vol. 8 , Article 1.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.luthersem.edu/jctr/vol8/iss2003/1
The Trinity and the 
Freedom of God
Paul D. Molnar
St. John’s University
A contemporary doctrine of the immanent Trinity is essential for recognizing, upholding and 
respecting divine freedom as the basis of relevant theological activity and genuine human 
freedom. In this article I contend that divine freedom will be recognized and respected only if and 
to the extent that such recognition is grounded in God’s actual freedom for us exercised in the 
history of Jesus Christ and through the action of his Holy Spirit.¹ Hearing this thesis in a vacuum 
one could perhaps wonder why anyone would bother to say this at all since most contemporary 
theologians would agree with this thesis, at least formally. But this thesis is in fact loaded because, 
while most Christian theologians would agree that a doctrine of the immanent Trinity should 
help us recognize, uphold and respect God’s freedom as the basis, meaning and goal of human 
freedom, very many contemporary theologians tend to read back their experiences and concepts 
into God instead of allowing God the eternal Father, Son and Holy Spirit to defi ne the content of 
those concepts and experiences.
In other words I believe that Athanasius’s all important statement that “It is more pious 
and more accurate to signify God from the Son and call him Father, than to name him from his 
works and call him Unoriginate” should govern contemporary thought about divine and human 
relations.² Indeed, if this Athanasian insight were respected today, then the dangers of Arianism, 
which Colin Gunton has recently called the “favorite” and “most appealing” heresy of the 20th
century,³ could be overcome in such a way that instead of us creating God in our image based 
on our ideas and experiences of relationality, temporality, maternity and paternity, we may once 
again recognize that it is God who has in fact created us in his image and that God’s revelation 
is not a construct of human experience but a sovereign act of a loving God within history, which 
includes the history of human experience.
¹ This thesis is developed more fully in my recent book, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent 
Trinity: In Dialogue with Karl Barth and Contemporary Theology (London/New York: T & T Clark/Continuum, 
2002), hereafter Divine Freedom. It also includes a fuller discussion of the main works cited below.
² Athanasius, Contra Ar. 1.34, in A Select Library of Nicene and Post-nicene Fathers of the Christian Church 
Second Series, trans. and ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1987), 326. Cf. also Thomas F. 
Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church (hereafter: The Trinitarian 
Faith), (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1987), 6 and 49.
³ Colin E. Gunton, “Begotten, Not Made,” in Nicene Christianity: The Future for a New Ecumenism, ed. 
Christopher R. Seitz (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Brazos Press, 2001), 35.
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In order to accomplish this I will argue for what can be termed a contemporary doctrine of 
the immanent Trinity. Such a doctrine in the fi rst instance would avoid irrelevant speculation 
about God’s inner nature, abstracted from God’s own self-revelation because this is and has been 
damaging to theology and practice within the Church. There are two implications here: fi rst, one 
must avoid confusing or separating the immanent and economic Trinity; and second, one must 
adhere to the economic Trinity for one’s information about the immanent Trinity. In the second 
instance a contemporary doctrine of the immanent Trinity would be aware that many modern 
theologians either argue against such a doctrine or simply pay lip-service to it precisely because 
they realize the importance of such a doctrine in recognizing and upholding God’s freedom and 
distinction from creation. A contemporary doctrine of the immanent Trinity will certainly want 
to avoid either of these alternatives.
In formulating a contemporary doctrine of the immanent Trinity I rely on the thinking of 
Karl Barth who argues that “the content of the doctrine of the Trinity…is not that God in His 
relation to man is Creator, Mediator and Redeemer, but that God in Himself is eternally God 
the Father, Son and Holy Spirit…[God acting as Emmanuel] cannot be dissolved into His work 
and activity.”⁴ Hence while Barth insisted that the immanent Trinity was identical in content 
with the economic Trinity, he also made a clear and sharp distinction in order to underscore 
God’s freedom in se and ad extra. Without acknowledging that freedom and without allowing 
that freedom to determine what can and cannot be said about God and God’s relations with us in 
history, theology would simply become our conversation with ourselves with the result that we 
would be unable to recognize our deepest human need, which is for the righteousness that can 
only come from God himself. We would therefore fi nd ourselves alone with ourselves and more 
and more cut off from the only true source of human freedom.
While most contemporary theologians accept Rahner’s axiom that “the immanent Trinity 
is strictly identical with the economic Trinity and vice versa,” I argue here that it is precisely the 
vice versa that has caused so many today, including Rahner himself, to compromise both divine 
and human freedom.⁵ Such thinking, which begins agnostically with the idea that God is perhaps 
in the fi rst instance to be recognized as the nameless, holy mystery or as a matrix surrounding 
human life, leaves it to us, at least in some measure, to fi ll in the gap created by that agnostic view. 
Inevitably that gap is fi lled with pantheistic and dualistic images of God and God’s relations with 
us in history so that it seems that pantheism and dualism are the only alternatives to a theology 
that is actually grounded in the Trinitarian self-revelation. That is why, in addition to relying on 
Barth’s key insights regarding the Trinity, I also rely on the thought of Thomas F. Torrance to 
⁴ Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God, trans. G. T. Thomson and Harold Knight, vol. 1, pt. 2 of Church 
Dogmatics, 4 vols. in 13 pts. (hereafter: CD) (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1970), 878–79.
⁵ Karl Rahner, “Theology and Anthropology,” trans. Graham Harrison, vol. 9 in Theological Investigations, 23
vols. (hereafter: TI) (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 28–45, 32. See also TI 9, 130. Cf. Karl Rahner, The Trinity, 
trans. by Joseph Donceel, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 22–30.
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maintain that an accurate understanding of the triune God can only take place if we think from a 
center in God rather than from a center in ourselves. Of course God himself provides that center 
in the incarnation and in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. And that is precisely why a clear 
distinction between the immanent and economic Trinity, reason and revelation, nature and grace 
and philosophy and theology is crucial.
Put succinctly, I maintain that there are several indications that God’s freedom has been 
compromised (along with human freedom) by those theologians whose thinking is not 
actually shaped by the economic Trinitarian self-revelation, despite the fact that many of these 
same theologians claim they really are starting their thinking with the economic Trinitarian 
self-revelation: 1) the trend towards making God, in some sense, dependent upon and 
indistinguishable from history; 2) the lack of precision in Christology which leads to the idea that 
Jesus, in his humanity as such, is the revealer; 3) the failure to distinguish the Holy Spirit from the 
human spirit; 4) the trend to begin theology with experiences of self-transcendence, thus allowing 
experience rather than the object of faith to determine the truth of theology.
Regarding the fi rst indication, let us briefl y explore the trend towards making God, in some 
sense, dependent upon and indistinguishable from history. A number of contemporary proposals 
fall into this category. For instance, using the image of a dance, Catherine LaCugna argues that 
“There are not two sets of communion—one among the divine persons, the other among human 
persons.…The one perichoresis, the one mystery of communion includes God and humanity as 
beloved partners in the dance.”⁶ Lest there be any confusion about what she means, LaCugna 
continues by saying “The exodus of all persons from God and the return of all to God is the 
divine dance in which God and we are eternal partners.” And this leads to the conclusion that 
“The life of God is not something that belongs to God alone. Trinitarian life is also our life.…The 
doctrine of the Trinity is not ultimately a teaching about ‘God’ but a teaching about God’s life 
with us and our life with each other.”⁷
Lutheran theologian Ted Peters follows LaCugna’s thinking, stressing these exact thoughts in 
his book on the Trinity: “As soon as we free ourselves from thinking of two levels of Trinity, one 
ad intra and the other ad extra, then we can see again that there is but one life of the triune God; 
and that life includes God’s relation to us.”⁸ Hence Peters affi rms LaCugna’s belief that “The life 
of God is not something that belongs to God alone. Trinitarian life is also our life.”⁹ Peters thus 
argues that we need not assume that the three persons of the Trinity are identical or equal in 
nature because “The notion of one being in three persons is simply a conceptual device for trying 
⁶ Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God For Us The Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 
1991), 274.
⁷ Ibid., 222–24 and 228.
⁸ Ted Peters, God as Trinity: Relationality and Temporality in Divine Life (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John 
Knox Press, 1993), 125.
⁹ Ibid., 126.
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to understand the drama of salvation that is taking place in Jesus Christ.”¹⁰ And this leads him to 
conclude, using as his criterion relationality as understood in social psychology, that “the fullness 
of God as Trinity is a reality yet to be achieved in the eschatological consummation.”¹¹
The point of this article, however, is that the doctrine of the Trinity is indeed ultimately a 
teaching about God. In and through that teaching we are able to recognize that, as Barth put it, 
“We cannot say anything higher or better of the ‘inwardness of God’ than that God is Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit and therefore that He is love in Himself without and before loving us, and 
without being forced to love us.”¹² This triunity is the only viable basis of human freedom as well. 
Yet, because our knowledge of God is really grounded in God himself acting ad extra we cannot 
change who God is by seeking some sort of description for God that ignores or compromises 
the fact that from eternity God really is none other than the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in a 
unique and transcendent way. And when this God acts for us in history he does not abandon this 
internal freedom but exercises it. That exercise of God’s freedom for us is the unshakable ground 
of Christian knowledge and ethics. This freedom of God is what has been blurred and called into 
question by the rather pantheistic understanding of the Trinity espoused by LaCugna and Peters. 
And it is just for this reason that their thinking undermines any genuine perception of contingent 
human freedom in its distinction from God with its own relevancy given by God himself.
What sense does it make to speak about God’s life with us and our life with each other when 
God does not have a life in himself? In the thinking of LaCugna and Peters the word God simply 
loses its meaning by becoming no more than a description of our relations with each other 
which are then described as God’s own relation to himself. This issue is discussed at length in 
my book, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity, and is related to LaCugna’s 
dualistic idea that she cannot fi nd God in Jesus Christ except insofar as he humanly embodies 
“divinization.” Thus for her “His person, as the achievement of truly divinized human nature is 
in this sense [that he lived, died and was raised to eternal life] eternal”¹³ while for Ted Peters “the 
divinity of the Son is gained through his total identifi cation with the Father: Jesus embodies the 
Father’s will…those who put their faith in Jesus fi nd themselves putting their faith in God.”¹⁴
But LaCugna and Peters are not alone. Other contemporary theologians think God is 
somehow dependent on history for the unfolding of his being. This can be seen in the thinking 
of Robert Jenson and Wolfhart Pannenberg. While Barth insisted that the Logos Asarkos had 
a proper role to play in Trinitarian theology and in Christology, Robert Jenson opposes any 
thought of a Logos Asarkos and instead argues that Rahner’s axiom is acceptable if it is understood 
eschatologically. That is why he argues that “Instead of interpreting Christ’s deity as a separate 
¹⁰ Ibid., 70.
¹¹ Ibid., 16.
¹² CD /2, 377.
¹³ God For Us, 317 and 296.
¹⁴ God as Trinity, 180.
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entity that always was…we should interpret it as a fi nal outcome, and just so as eternal.”¹⁵ But 
this means that Jesus will not fi nally be the eternal Son of the Father until salvation is complete, 
just as the economic Trinity will not be the immanent Trinity until salvation is complete. Such 
thinking, with its adoptionist overtones, leads to the idea that Christ’s Sonship comes from his 
resurrection with the twin ideas that “Jesus would not be the Word without the Resurrection” 
and “the resurrection is [the Christian] God’s ousia.”¹⁶ It goes without saying that such thinking 
compromises Christ’s antecedent existence as the eternal Son of the Father before all worlds.
Pannenberg’s thinking is infl uential here: “Only the Easter event determines what the 
meaning was of the pre-Easter history of Jesus and who he was in his relation to God.”¹⁷ And 
“Apart from Jesus’ resurrection, it would not be true that from the very beginning of his earthly 
way God was one with this man. That is true from all eternity because of Jesus’ resurrection.”¹⁸
Perhaps the most important indicator in this circumstance is the idea expressed by Ted Peters 
that “God’s eternity is gained through the victory of resurrection and transformation.”¹⁹ The 
most important point that needs to be made here is that with the acknowledgment of God’s pre-
temporal self-suffi cient existence in the form of a limited acceptance of a Logos Asarkos we are 
led to see that God does not need to gain his eternity by relating with history, but rather reveals 
the distinct nature of his eternity through the events of Jesus’ life and through the power of the 
resurrection in particular.
Regarding the second indication that both divine and human freedom tend to be compromised 
today, let me briefl y explain the lack of precision in Christology that follows from the belief that 
Jesus in his humanity as such is the revealer. This is Rahner’s position. But it has been widely 
infl uential across the board in contemporary theology. And the basic problem is that it implies 
a confusion of Jesus’ divinity and humanity so that one could then suppose that revelation 
becomes an element in Jesus’ human experience and then in our experience of ourselves through 
what Rahner labels our experience of self-transcendence. Indeed at least one Rahnerian actually 
interprets Christ’s humanity as his divinity under the rubric “theandric.”²⁰ Thus he writes, “For 
Rahner, human nature, though created, is potentially divine, and in the case of Christ actually 
so.”²¹ That is why Rahner argues that revelation is in some sense identical with what he calls our 
“transcendentality” and that self-acceptance is the same as acceptance of Christ. That thinking 
opens the door to his anonymous Christianity which in my view undercuts the need for faith in 
¹⁵ Robert W. Jenson, God According to the Gospel: The Triune Identity (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 140. 
¹⁶ Ibid., 74–5.
¹⁷ Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1994), 345. 
¹⁸ Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe, 2nd ed. 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), 321. 
¹⁹ God as Trinity, 175.
²⁰ David Coffey, “The Theandric Nature of Christ,” Theological Studies 60 (1999): 405–31.
²¹ Ibid., 412.
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Christ himself and universalizes grace and revelation by detaching them from Christ and locating 
them once again within human experience in a Pelagian way in the form of the supernatural 
existential. But I believe that Stanley Grenz and Roger Olson are correct in their judgment that 
the supernatural existential is a highly unstable concept that, when universalized, amounts to 
little more than an immanentism not unlike Schleiermacher’s God-consciousness.²² Curiously 
it is just this thinking that also opens the door to a Nestorian separation of the two natures in 
Christ, and once again invites dualistic conceptions of our relations with the Christian God.
The third and fourth indications mentioned above are inseparably bound together. Hence 
failure to distinguish the Holy Spirit from the human spirit, which is all too widespread today, 
stems from starting theology with experiences of self-transcendence instead of with the Word 
of God revealed, written and proclaimed. I believe that whenever theology is unclear about the 
fact that it is strictly the object of faith, namely, the eternal Father, Son and Holy Spirit who 
determines the truth of theology, then the experience of faith is thought to become the source 
and norm for theology. This has led to disastrous results; the most prominent among these is 
the idea that God can and should be understood on the basis of our own self-experience. This 
thinking drives Rahner’s transcendental method and leads to a confl ict in his thinking.
Thus, on the one hand Rahner wishes to unite fundamental and dogmatic theology 
by beginning his thought with the economic Trinitarian self-revelation. But on the other 
hand Rahner actually begins his theology with the method of natural theology by analyzing 
transcendental experience to arrive at a knowledge of God as the nameless silent term of the 
experience of transcendence. Rahner therefore describes God as the “holy mystery” surrounding 
our lives. But the God thus known is in confl ict with the God that Rahner believes we know 
through God’s self-communication in Christ through the Holy Spirit. What happens in the 
thought of too many contemporary theologians is that they allow questions of theological 
content to be dictated by the naturally known God encountered in their own experiences of self-
transcendence with the result that even God’s triunity is shaped by their naturally known God 
and both divine and human freedom are compromised in the process.²³
There is space here for only one example of what I mean. Elizabeth Johnson follows Rahner’s 
transcendental method and concludes that since human experience and knowledge of God 
are mutually dependent, therefore “the personal history of the experience of the self is in its 
total extent the history of the ultimate experience of God also.”²⁴ This leads her to argue that 
²² Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, 20th Century Theology: God & the World in a Transitional Age (Carlisle, 
UK: The Paternoster Press, 1992), 246–47. 
²³ For a full discussion of this diffi culty in Rahner’s theology see Molnar, Divine Freedom, Chapter Four.
²⁴ Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 
1992), 66. 
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God must be reconceived as Mother so that the symbol God may function by overcoming any 
inequality that still exists between men and women today. But the problem with this thinking 
is that it operates from a center in human experience rather than from a center in God with the 
result that the limitations of experience are projected into God. The suggestion in this thinking 
is that God is a symbol that we humans invest with meaning to achieve certain social, religious 
or political goals. But the problem with naming God Mother is primarily the suggestion that it 
is our political, religious or social agenda that allows such a redefi nition of the Christian God. If, 
however, Barth is correct, and I think he is, and there is nothing higher or deeper to God than the 
fact that he is the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in eternity and as God for us in history, then this 
thinking represents more an attempt to re-create God in our own image than to accept God as he 
is and as he has created us in his image.
This thinking fails to realize that God was not named Mother in scripture or in the tradition 
for very defi nite reasons. As Roland Frye has argued, many feminist theologians make the 
mistake of confusing metaphor and simile, and then make the additional mistake of thinking that 
because a word like Sophia has a feminine ending therefore God could be thought of as the divine 
feminine.²⁵ But the diffi culty with this is that it has Arian, Gnostic and polytheist overtones. And 
as Elizabeth Achtemeier has pointed out, while Israel was surrounded by people who worshipped 
female deities, Israel worshipped one God who could not be identifi ed with the world: “It is 
precisely the introduction of female language for God that opens the door to such identifi cation 
of God with the world.”²⁶
The ultimate diffi culty here of course stems from the way analogy is conceived. According 
to Elizabeth Johnson, “analogy…means that while it [human naming of God] starts from the 
relationship of paternity experienced at its best in this world, its inner dynamism negates the 
creaturely mode to assert that God is more unlike than like even the best human father.”²⁷ But 
according to the analogy of faith as understood by Barth, any such analogy must start from 
Jesus Christ himself and thus think from a center in God rather than from a center in ourselves. 
It is just because Johnson begins her theology by insisting that God must be named from 
within the matrix of women’s experience that she reaches this conclusion regarding analogy. 
But it is just this thinking that compromises a proper understanding of God’s fatherhood in 
its utter uniqueness as something that cannot be known by negating our human experience of 
fatherhood. Johnson’s thinking ultimately leads her to argue that we can never really describe 
God’s inner being and that “God is like a Trinity.”²⁸ It goes without saying, of course, that God 
²⁵ See Roland Frye, “Language for God and Feminist Language: Problems and Principles,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 41, 4 (1988): 441–69. See also Speaking the Christian God: The Holy Trinity and the Challenge of Feminism, ed. 
Alvin F. Kimel, Jr. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1992).
²⁶ Elizabeth Achtemeier, “Exchanging God for ‘No Gods,’” in Kimel, Speaking the Christian God, 8–9.
²⁷ She Who Is, 173.
²⁸ Ibid., 205.
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is not like a Trinity because God exists eternally as the Triune God—he is a Trinity in unity and 
not just a Trinity but the Trinity. And that means he never exists in any other way except as the 
eternal Father, Son and Spirit in indissoluble unity and indestructible distinction.
There is then a thread that runs through the theologians we have briefl y canvassed in this 
article. That commonality suggests there is a tendency to allow experience rather than the Word 
of God revealed to dictate the meaning of theological categories. That very fact illustrates a 
confusion of the Holy Spirit with the human spirit. It is my contention that a contemporary 
doctrine of the immanent Trinity should recognize that while the doctrine of the Trinity begins 
with an experience of God in the economy, it nonetheless directs us away from our experiences 
and toward God’s Word and Spirit as the source of theological knowledge. To be sure, God 
meets us in our experiences of faith and hope; but the object of Trinitarian refl ection is and 
remains God and never becomes our experiences of faith and hope. In this sense the doctrine 
of the immanent Trinity is a description of who God is who meets us in and through our 
experiences and not simply a description of salvation history or of our experiences of faith and 
hope. Whenever and wherever theologians think the doctrine is simply a way of describing the 
Christian experiences of faith, hope or salvation (which unfortunately happens all too frequently 
today), such thinking invariably substitutes some form of Trinitarian thinking for the Trinitarian 
God acting ad extra. And any such substitution compromises both divine and human freedom by 
beginning to think of God agnostically and then ending with some form of pantheism or dualism 
and far from the Christian God who really is for us but for us only in his Word and Spirit.
